The latest crisis is a continuation of old structural disputes. Last Feburary marked the start of another round of violent confrontation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The trigger was a bomb blast in Islamabad, which resulted in the loss of many innocent lives. The next action in the sequence was airstrikes against terrorist facilities in  Afghanistan by Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban claimed that only innocent women and children lost their lives. Pakistan views Afghanistan as harbouring TTP, which is, of course, denied by the Taliban. TTP is widely seen as simply another front of the Afghan Taliban, being in principle and fact attached to the Afghan Taliban’s Supreme leader. There have been (at times) acrimonious relations between the two Asian neighbors, which form the background against the current crisis. 

The main point of contention is probably the always lurking issue of the 1893 “Durand” line, the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is denied as such by the latter. Agreed between the then (British) India and Afghanistan, their respective spheres of influence were demarcated. That was the issue highlighted by successive Afghan governments (especially Daud Khan’s, when there was even an Afghan foray into the tribal areas, which was successfully repelled). An important side was the confirmation vote admitting Pakistan into the United Nations, where Afghanistan was the only country to oppose it. The acrimony proved enduring. That has been a constant in Pak-Afghan relations, irrespective of who is in charge in Afghanistan. 

The next event that marked an important point in the relations was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the behest of the Communist government, which had deposed and killed the late Afghan president, Daud Khan. Khan himself had come into power by mounting a coup against his family member, King Zahir. The Communist government, being alienated from the populace, committed to violence to strengthen its rule. The instability of successive governments in Afghanistan resulted in a general uprising, and “Mujahideen” as a counter force to their rule came into existence. The concern was that Afghanistan is only a stop, and the next destination is the warm waters of the Arabian Sea, which naturally meant either cutting through Iran or Pakistan. 

America, with Pakistan’s help, aided the Mujahideen in resisting the Soviets, where Pakistan had a direct stake in the pursuit of its own safety. The dead end came when the Soviets departed, and America left Pakistan to deal with the consequences of the Afghan war. Foreign fighters brought to aid the anti-Soviet struggle, armed to the teeth, had a free rein. Not only that, Pakistan had to deal with both the drug and Kalashnikov (weapons) culture (both anomalies in Pakistan before the Soviet invasion). These were supplemented by Afghan refugees, which Pakistan had to absorb despite its economic perils.

The ensuing civil war, which was in fact a power struggle between the erstwhile Mujahideen warlords, saw much death and destruction, and the rise of another armed group in southern Afghanistan, the ‘Taliban’. Seen as a movement against rapacious warlords, the Taliban quickly gained enough strength to displace other warring elements and establish their rule in all of the country except the small pocket of Panjshir under Ahmad Shah Massoud. The Taliban implemented a strict version of theocracy, which witnessed punishments for stoning for adultery. 

The pariah state was swiftly sanctioned, and its refusal to hand over Bin Laden, who was implicated in the 9/11 attacks, marked another turning point with the American invasion of the country. An interesting highlight of the period was the Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Omar, agreeing to hand over Bin Laden if he could get a sanctioned ruling (Fatwa) from leading Islamic scholars. According to Shuja Nawaz in his book “Crossed Swords”,  Omar later denied agreeing to any such arrangement at all. Taliban’s intransigence plunged the country into another war, which resulted in yet another round of deaths, destruction, and refugees. 

Pakistan had to choose, in the words of President Bush, to be either “with us or against us”. Pakistan, accused of supporting the group, lost thousands of its own citizens and billions of dollars to the “war on terror”. It is pertinent to mention that, no matter how plausible the idea of foreign support, no group can take on asymmetrical (guerilla) warfare for long without popular support. The dead end again came with the withdrawal of American forces and the fall of the installed regime in Afghanistan in 2021. History has now come full circle.

To successfully root out the menace of terrorism once and for all, Pakistan must take its constituents who are most affected by terrorism (people of the erstwhile FATA) into confidence. The whole situation should be debated in parliament, and a new national agreement on drawing clear boundaries and red lines that must not be compromised under any circumstances. That not only reflects the makings of an informed decision but the national will itself. Any policy that is backed by the people as a whole is bound to succeed.